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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Priority No. 2

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 910019
FRED A. ALVAREZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for a capital offense. This
court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3) (i)
(1953 as amended).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction and final judgment entered against appellant
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Richard
Moffat, Judge, presiding. On November 29, 1990, appellant was found guilty by a
jury of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a capital offense,
as described in Utah Code Annotated §76-5-202 (1953 as amended). Appellant was
sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-year mandatory minimum enhancement
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pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended) was imposed on
November 29, 1990. Judgment was entered on December 6, 1990. Notice of appeal
was filed on December 3, 1990. An amended notice of appeal was filed on January
2, 1991.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does the Utah Constitution prevent the use of a "death qualified" jury to

determine a defendant's guilt or innocence in a capital case?
2.

Did the State's use of its peremptory challenges to strike two-thirds of

the hispanics from the jury venire violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
3.

Was the evidence sufficient to establish the offense of murder in the first

degree?
4.

Did the trial court improperly instruct the jury on the elements of first

degree murder?
5.

Did the trial court erroneously enhance appellant's sentence for acting

in concert with two or more other persons?
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 of the United States Constitution:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; or
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shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7:
No persons shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Article I, Section 9:
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned
shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.
Article I, Section 10:
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital
cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases
three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil
cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Article I, Section 12:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses
in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal
in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
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shall not be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not
be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-401 (1953 as amended):
In this part unless the context requires a different
definition,"single criminal episode" means all conduct which
is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or
modify the effect of Section 77-21-31 in controlling the
joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings.
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(1) (1953 as amended):
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes
speech.
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1953 as amended):
Every person, acting with the mental state required
for the commission of an offense who directly commits the
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a
party for such conduct.
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1(1) (1953 as amended):
(a) A person who commits any offense listed in
Subsection (3) in concert with two or more persons is
subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided
below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used
in this section means the defendant and two or more other
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persons would be criminally liable for the offense as parties
under Section 76-2-202.
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1(5) (1953 as amended):
(a) This section does not create any separate
offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the primary
offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties
under this section that the persons with whom the actor is
alleged to have acted in concert are not identified,
apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or
lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall
decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty under this
section. The imposition of the penalty is contingent upon
a finding by the sentencing judge that this section is
applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall
enter written findings of fact concerning the applicability of
this section.
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(b) (1953 as amended):
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the
death of another under any of the following circumstances
...

The homicide was committed incident to one act,
scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during
which two or more persons are killed.
Rule 18(3)(10) of the Utah rules of Criminal Procedure:
The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular
juror and may be taken on one or more of the following
grounds: . . .
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if the offense charged is punishable with death, the
entertaining of such conscientious opinions about the death
penalty as would preclude the juror from voting to impose
the death penalty following conviction regardless of the
facts.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 16, 1990, appellant, Fred A. Alvarez and Richard Gabaldon were
jointly charged with two counts of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202 (1953 as amended). (R. 7-9) The information
was amended on July 1 1 , 1990, to include a sentencing enhancement pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended). (R. 11) At the preliminary hearing,
the court determined that there was insufficient evidence to hold Gabaldon for trial
on the first degree murder charges. The State filed a Second Amended Information
charging Gabaldon with two counts of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second
Degree and charging appellant with the original counts of Criminal Homicide, Murder
in the First Degree. (R. 29-31) Prior to trial, Gabaldon plead guilty to two counts of
Aggravated Assault, violations of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended),
third degree felonies. This was done in exchange for his testimony against appellant.
(Tr. 14)
The jury panel was "death qualified" pursuant to Rule 18(e)(10) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Tr. 106 et. seq.)

Following selection of the panel,

appellant moved for a mistrial based on the State's discriminatory use of its
peremptory challenges. (Tr. 484) After a ten day trial, the jury returned a verdict of
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guilty as to Count I for the death of Don Newingham and not guilty as to Count II for
the death of Shayne Newingham. (R. 193-195) Appellant waived his right to a jury
trial for the death penalty phase of the proceedings. (Tr. 1415)

The trial judge

imposed a sentence of life in prison for the homicide charge which included an
enhancement of a mandatory minimum term of twenty years pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On Friday, June 8, 1990, appellant and fifteen to twenty other juveniles and
young adults were at a party at the home of Kim and Richard Gabaldon. (Tr. 1098,
1059) There was considerable use of alcohol at that party. (Tr. pp. 607, 609, 613,
1091, 1115)

At approximately 11:30 p.m. a group of five uninvited individuals

arrived. They included Don and Shayne Newingham (father and son, respectively),
Robert Rivas, Kenny Salas and Paul Velasquez. (Tr. pp. 963, 918) Before going to the
Gabaldon residence, those five had been drinking. The Newinghams and Salas were
also using cocaine. (TT. 864, 867, 916-17)
At the Gabaldon residence, Salas and Don Newingham got out of the car and
approached the door. (Tr. 920-21)

Gabaldon met the two at the front door and

informed them that they were not welcome. (Tr. 621-22) When asked to leave, Don
Newingham objected vehemently and became verbally abusive to those at the party.
(Tr. at 623, 6 3 1 , 636, 684, 899, 1052, 1263, 1286) At that point, appellant pulled
a knife from his pants, held it to his chest and requested Don Newingham to leave.
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(Tr. 615). Newingham continued to argue, and stated, "I'm not going to let no young
punk pull no knife out on me because I'm going to stick him first." (Tr. 636, 1264)
A pocket knife was found in Newingham's possession. (Tr. 735)
Salas and Don Newingham eventually left the house and moved toward their
car. (Tr. 925)

Several of the individuals from inside the house followed them,

including appellant, Gabaldon and Anthony DeHerrera. (Tr. at 635, 662, 925, 1265)
As the group approached, Paul Valasquez exited the vehicle to talk with appellant.
They met in front of the car where appellant informed Valasquez that he was welcome
to come back to the party, but the Newinghams were not welcome because Gabaldon
did not know them. (Tr. 880, 1264) As appellant and Valasquez spoke, an altercation
broke out between Don Newingham and Gabaldon. (Tr. 880) Salas and Valasquez
testified that Gabaldon struck Don Newingham in the face with his fist. The larger
Newingham was then able to get Gabaldon to the ground and began to beat Gabaldon
with his fists. (Tr. 6 8 1 , 927) Salas and Valasquez testified at that time, appellant
jumped on Don Newingham's back and stabbed him several times with a knife. (Tr.
682, 927) Salas testified further that Don Newingham was able to push himself off
the ground, causing appellant to fall backwards. (Tr. 928)

He also testified that

appellant, while falling, accidently stuck himself in the leg with the knife. (Tr. 926)
Appellant testified that when the fight broke out between Gabaldon and Don
Newingham, he kicked at Newingham and was stabbed in the leg. (Tr. 1265)
Appellant then stated that he then began wildly swinging the knife that he had
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previously produced. (Tr. 1266) Appellant indicated that he may have struck the elder
Newingham with the knife, but was not sure. (Tr. 1325) Kriss Blackhorse and Shauna
Pina, both of whom had been at the party, testified that after the fight ended,
Anthony DeHerrera entered the house carrying two knives. (Tr. 1014, 1143) Those
witnesses and others who spoke with DeHerrera after the fight stated that DeHerrera
bragged about stabbing the father. (Tr. 1055, 1097, 1114)
During the initial altercation between Don Newingham and Gabaldon, Shayne
Newingham got out of the car and began to fight with others. (Tr. 884) He struck
Manuel Martinez in the head, then threw Martinez into a truck, knocking him
unconscious. (Tr. 1031, 1054, 1124, 1234) The younger Newingham then struck
both Fernando Negrete and Manuel Alvarez with his fists. (Tr. 1092)

There was

contradictory testimony about how Shayne Newingham was stabbed. Paul Valasquez
testified that he observed appellant stick Shayne Newingham with the knife after Don
Newingham had been stabbed. (Tr. 886) Anthony Valerio testified that as Shayne
Newingham "got the best" of Gabaldon, he observed Anthony DeHerrera stab Shayne
Newingham in the shoulder. (Tr. 1236) Gabaldon testified that as he fought with
Shayne Newingham, DeHerrera was striking Newingham in the back. (Tr. 675)
Dr. Todd Gray, Utah State Medical Examiner, testified that both Shayne and
Don Newingham died as a result of multiple stab wounds. (Tr. 983, 1001) Shayne
Newingham had two knife wounds in his back, another near his armpit and a fourth
in the abdomen. (Tr. 961-976) Don Newingham suffered three knife wounds to his
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back. (Tr. 893-1000)

Dr. Gray testified that all of the wounds were consistent with

injuries that may be inflicted by a large hunting knife. (Tr. 983, 1002) Such a knife
had been located by police detectives in a washing machine, under towels in the
Gabaldon residence. (Tr. 768)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The process of "death qualification" of a jury panel violates the protections of
the Utah Constitution. Such a process results in jury panels that are more prone to
convict a capital defendant than juries that are not been subject to that procedure.
A separate jury should be selected for the penalty phase of a capital trial if the "death
qualification" procedure is to be employed.
The State used its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner in
excluding hispanics from jury service. The reasons stated by the prosecutor for the
exercise of those challenges were inconsistent with the information elicited from the
potential jurors who were stricken. The exercise of the peremptory challenges in such
a discriminatory manner violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The evidence is insufficient to establish that the two homicides were committed
incident to a single act, scheme, course of conduct or criminal episode. That is the
additional element that distinguishes first from second degree murder. The offense
of conviction should be ordered reduced from first to second degree murder.
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The trial court responded to a question from the jury during its deliberations in
a manner that would lead the jury to believe that one of the elements of first degree
murder need not be proved. Such an instruction relieved the State of proving that
element of the offense. That error requires that a new trial be ordered.
The application of the "gang enhancement" statute violated appellant's
constitutional right to due process of law as that statute is void for vagueness and
allows punishment for the unproved acts of unnamed third parties.

Furthermore,

appellant should have been entitled to a jury determination of his liability under that
statute. Finally, the evidence was insufficient to establish that appellant acted in
concert with two or more individuals who shared the intent to cause the death of
another. Consequently, the trial court erroneously applied the twenty year minimum
mandatory enhancement to appellant's sentence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROCESS OF "DEATH QUALIFICATION" OF THE
JURY VENIRE VIOLATES THE PROTECTIONS OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION AS IT RESULTS IN A JURY PANEL
MORE PRONE TO CONVICT.
Prior to trial, appellant objected to the "death qualification" of the jury venire,
(R. 129; 376 at 8) That is the process of questioning potential jurors about their
opinions regarding the death penalty pursuant to Rule 18(e)(10) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Appellant contended that the procedure creates juries which are
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conviction prone in violation of his state constitutional rights as described in Article
I, Sections 7, 9, 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution. This position has been rejected
under a federal constitutional analysis.1 However, a state constitutional analysis
warrants another result. Since this is a legal issue a standard of review of correction
of error should be employed. Oats v. Chavez. 749 P.2d 659 (Utah 1988).
The Supreme Court first addressed the practice of death qualification of juries
and held that individuals expressing concern about the death penalty could not be
excluded for cause from the jury if they would follow the court's instructions
regarding the death penalty. Withersooon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18, (1968).
The Court did not address the issue of whether death qualification was per se
unconstitutional. However, the Court issued an invitation for presentation of factual

1

See State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1950 (Utah 1987) (holding that pursuant to
Lockhartv. McCree. 476 U.S. 162 (1986), death qualification of a jury did not violate
the defendant's federal constitutional rights, defendant's state constitutional rights
specifically were not addressed); State v. Schaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986)
(relying on Lockhart and its analysis this Court held that "the individual, sequestered
death-qualification voir dire of prospective jurors in a capital homicide case does not,
in and of itself, violate the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury." id. at
1312.); State v. Moore. 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985) (the exclusion of individuals who
would apply the death penalty in cases even if the mitigating circumstances
outweighed the aggravating circumstances as well as individuals who would never
apply the death penalty, provides a balance to the death qualification process.
However, this Court noted, "We realize that the disqualification of such persons does
not fully meet defendant's point about conviction-prone jurors . . ." Jd. at 237); State
v. Norton. 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983) (holding that like "Witherspoon Excludables"
individuals that would automatically impose the death penalty must be excused for
cause): See also. State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988); State v. Schreuder,
726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986); State v. Codianna. 573 P.2d 343 (Utah 1977); State
v. Kelbach. 461 P.2d 297 (Utah 1969).
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data on that question in the future. The Court noted that with the presentation of
stronger evidence, death qualified juries may be shown to be conviction prone:
The question would then arise whether the State's interest
in submitting the penalty issue to the jury capable of
imposing capital punishment may be vindicated at the
expense of the defendant's interest in a completely fair
determination of guilt or innocence given the possibility of
using one jury to decide guilt and another to fix
punishment.
Id. at 520, n. 10.
Such evidence is now available. The Zeisel and Goldberg studies presented to
the Supreme Court in Witherspoon. have since been perfected, published and
reviewed.2 Additional studies have also been conducted. See generally: Griasbv v.
Mabrv. 569 F.Supp. 1273, 1292, 1302-05 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd, 758 F.2d 226
(8th Cir. 1985), rev', Lockhart v. McCree. supra.3 In 1986, this additional evidence

2

See: Goldberg, F., Capital Scruples. Jury Bias, and Use of Psychological Data to
Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 53
(1976); Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance. (University of
Chicago, unpublished manuscript (1957); Zeisel, H., Some Data on Juror Attitudes
Toward Capital Punishment. (University of Chicago Study in Criminal Justice (1968)).
3

Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty. Readdressing the Withersooon Question.
26 Crime and Delinquency 412-27 (1980); Packer. The Limits of the Criminal Sanction
(1968); Vidmar and Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty. 26 Stan.L.Rev.
1245-1270 (1974); Smith. A Trent Analysis of Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment.
1936-1974, in J.A. Davis (ed.) Studies of Social for the Death Penalty: Instrumental
Response to Crime or Symbolic Attitude, 17 Law and Society Review, 121-146
(1982); Ellsworth and Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close
Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists. 29 Crime and
Delinquency, 116-169 (1963); Fitzgerald and Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime
Control. 8 Law and Human Behavior 31 (1984), 42 Univ. Colo. L. Rev. 2 1 .
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was presented to the Supreme Court. The Court reversed the district court and court
of appeals' holdings that death qualification violated a capital defendant's
constitutional rights. Lockhart v. McCree. supra.4 See also, Adams v. Texas, 448
U.S. 38 (1980); Wainwrioht v. Witt. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
In spite of the Court's interpretation of the federal constitution this court should
consider the constitutionality of death qualification pursuant to the more expansive
rights of the Utah Constitution. This court is not bound by the Supreme Court's
decisions on the federal constitution in interpreting the Utah Constitution. Oregon v.
Haas. 420 U.S. 714, (1975); State v. Larocco. 749 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). See, e.g..
State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). Article I, Sections 7, 9, 10 and 12
of the Utah Constitution do not support the current practice of using the same death
qualified jury to decide both the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial.5
A.
The Utah Constitutional Provisions Provide Greater
Protections to Capital Defendants Than the Respective
Federal Counterparts.
This court has held the language in the last sentence of Article I, Section 9 of
the Utah Constitution, "Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with

4

One year later the United States Supreme Court extended the Lockhart holding
to co-defendants who were not charged with a crime subject to the death penalty.
Buchanan v. Kentucky,
U.S.
, 107 S.Ct. 2906, (1987). However, the
Buchanan analysis is likewise not binding on this court's analysis under the Utah
Constitution.
5

Lockhart. 476 U.S. at 184.
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unnecessary rigor," creates a protection more expansive than the federal counterpart.
State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 2 6 1 , 267 (Utah 1986). This court has also interpreted
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution to afford the accused greater protection
than the due process clause of the federal constitution. In State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d
644 (Utah 1986), the due process protection of the Utah Constitution was extended
to safeguard an accused from the refiling of criminal charges already dismissed at a
preliminary hearing. In State v. Saunders, 622 P.2d 738, 742 (Utah 1985), the court
cited State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980), in recognizing due process is
violated when prejudicial evidence reaches the jury where severance would have
prevented that evidence from being admitted, thus curing the problem.
Support for more expansive rights for the capital defendant can be found in the
discussion and debates of the State Constitution Convention regarding Article I,
Section 10: 6
Mr. Evans(Weber): But I see no reason why the trial of
ordinary criminal cases, there might not be a jury of nine,
as well as in civil cases, with a unanimous verdict, except
possibly in the case where the punishment might be capital.
A case so grave as that, some provision might be made
why the time-honored system of the jury might be
unchanged. I introduce this amendment, so it will raise
these questions, and I doubt not but that it will be

6

Article I, Section 10 provides:
In capital cases the right of the trial bv jury shall remain inviolate. In Courts of
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In
courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the
verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a
verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded, [emphasis added]
15

discussed with all deliberation, but for the best interest of
the new State, and also from a point of economy, if the
service can be retained the same. I hope it carried.
[emphasis added]
Proceedings Constitutional Convention 1895, Volume I at 258-59.
Mr. Squires. There is another provision there about capital
punishment is not there?
Mr. Evans (Weber): Yes: and I thank the gentlemen for
calling my attention to it. In capital offenses, where a man
is upon trial for his life, we preserve the old common law
jury of twelve men, who must render a unanimous verdict.
The provision is carefully drawn, and I think expresses the
view of the committee of the whole the other day, when
we were discussing that question.
Proceedings Constitutional Convention 1895, Volume I at 493.
The official report of the proceedings and debates of the constitutional
convention indicates that economy and expense were the concern in reducing the
number of jurors required to sit in non-capital cases.7 Analysis of the history of
Article I, Section 10 illustrates concerns for economy and expense were not sufficient
to compromise the rights of those individuals facing the death penalty. In Lockhart
the Supreme Court relied heavily on considerations of economy and efficient trial
management to uphold the State of Arkansas' interest of having one jury sit and

Reference to expense and economy can be found in the Proceedings
Constitutional Convention 1895, Volume I at 259, 2 6 1 , 276, 278, 279, 287 and
296.
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decide both the issue of guilty and punishment.8 Thus, the basis for the decision in
Lockhart is inapplicable to an analysis of the Utah Constitution. The historical basis
of the Utah Constitution excluding economic consideration from the jury selection
process in capital cases. That line of reasoning does not provide support for the
practice of death qualifying the jury sitting during the guilt phase of such a trial. The
constitutional debates support the position that the jury considering innocence or guilt
should not be death qualified. In the event the defendant is found guilty, a second
jury should be impaneled. That jury may be subjected to the "death qualification"
process.
The legislature has contemplated and provided for circumstances where it is
impractical to reconvene the jury that determined guilt for the sentencing phase. In
such situations, the court may convene a new jury for the limited purpose of
sentencing, Utah Code Ann. §76-3-207(1) (1953 as amended).

In light of the

conviction prone nature of a death qualified jury9, this court should require trial courts

8

This concern was articulated by the Court as follows,
. . . in most, if not all, capital cases much of the evidence adduced
at the guilt phases of the trial will also have a bearing on the penalty
phase: if two different juries were to be required, such testimony would
have to be presented twice, once to each jury.

Lockhart. 476 U. S. at 181.
9

See: Point I, B, infra.
17

to engage in a bifurcated proceeding in which the jury determining guilt would not be
subjected to the death qualification process.
B.
Empirical Studies Demonstrate that a Death Qualified Jury
is More Prone to Convict Than Juries Not Subject to That
Procedure.
In determining the effect of the death qualification procedure, this court should
consider Mr. Justice Marshall's persuasive summary of the reasoning of the studies
described in Griasby v. Mabrv, supra. He noted,
In the wake of Witherspoon, a number of researchers set
out to supplement the data that the Court had found
inadequate in that case. The results of these studies were
exhaustively analyzed by the District Court in this case, see
Griasbv v. Mabrv (Grigsby II), 569 F.Supp. 1273, 12911308 (E.D.Ark. 1983) and can only be briefly summarized
here, [footnote omitted] The data strongly suggest that the
death qualification excludes a significantly large subset-at
least 1 1 % to 17%-of potential jurors who could be
impartial during the guilt phase of the trial, [footnote
omitted] Among the members of the excludable class are
a disproportionate number of blacks and women. See id.,
at 1283, 1293-1294.
The perspectives on the criminal justice system of
jurors who survive death qualification are systematically
different from those of excluded jurors. Death-qualified
jurors are, for example, more Jikely to believe that a
defendant's failure to testify is indicative of his guilt, more
hostile to the insanity defense, more distrustful of defense
attorneys, and less concerned about the danger of
erroneous convictions, id-at 1283, 1293, 1304. This proprosecution bias is reflected in the greater readiness of
death qualified jurors to convict or to convict more serious
charges, id. at 1294-1302; Griasbv v. Mabrv, 758 F.2d
226, 233-236 (8th Cir. 1985). And, finally, the very
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process of death qualification-which focuses attention on
the death penalty before the trial has ever began-has been
found to predispose the jurors that survive it to believe that
the defendant is guilty. 569 F.Supp., at 1302-1305; 758
F.2d at 234.
Lockhart v. McCree, supra at 156-57 (Marshall J., dissenting).
This court needs to consider the great weight of these studies. In Griasbv. the
state's witness conceded that the studies were conducted with sound methodology.
Griasbv. supra, at 1309. Further, no evidence or studies contrary to those presented
to the trial court in Griasbv were provided by the state. As noted by Justice Marshall,
Yet even after considering the evidence adduced by
the State, the Court of Appeals properly noted: "There are
no studies which contradict the studies submitted [by
respondent]; in other words, all of the documented studies
supported the district court's findings." [Griasbv v. Mabrvl
758 F.2d at 238.
476 U.S. at 190. (Marshall, dissenting)
Courts reviewing these studies have found that the death qualification process
"stacks the deck" against the defendant, creating a conviction prone jury that is
underrepresentative of the community. Griasbv v. Mabrv, supra, at 1292, 1302-05;
Hovev v. Superior Court. 616 P.2d 1301 (Cal. 1980). In State v. Moore, supra, the
court noted that with respect to studies evidencing death qualified juries being more
inclined to convict than non-death-qualified juries, this court stated, "The defendant's
data may well be correct. It is, of course, settled that a State may not entrust the
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determination of whether a man is innocent or guilty to a tribunal 'organized to
convict/" Witherspoon. supra, at 521. 10
C.
The Death-Qualification of the Jury in this Case Requires
That Appellant Receive a New Trial.
It is not disputed that the voir dire in the instant case was carefully conducted
in an effort to mitigate negative effects. 11

However, the process of death

qualification is inherently flawed and the trial court's care in conducting voir dire
merely served to heighten the jurors' focus on the death penalty and a presumption
of guilt. 12 Individuals who have scruples concerning the death penalty tend to have

10

The district court judge in Griasby stated:
"A jury so selected [through the use of the death qualification process]
will not, therefore, be composed of a cross section of the community,
rather, it will be composed of a group of persons who are uncommonly
predisposed to favor the persons who are uncommonly predisposed to
favor the prosecution, a jury "organized to convict."

Griasbv, 569 F. Supp. at 1304 relying on Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty
Readdressing the Witherspoon Question, supra.
11

The general text of the voir dire concerning death penalty issues is set forth at
R. 281-284. Counsel were allowed to further question those jurors expressing
scruples about the death penalty to determine if such scruples could be set aside if
the aggravating factors out weighed the mitigating factors.
12

The district court judge in Griasbv summarized the effect of focusing on the
death penalty prior to trial as follows:
E5y focusing on the penalty before the trial actually begins the key
participants, the judge, the prosecutor and the defense counsel convey
the impression that they all believe the defendant is guilty, that the
20

"due process" concerns whereas individuals who survive death qualification tend to
have "law and order" concerns.

Griasbv. supra, at 1311. 1 3

The process of

questioning jurors on the issue of the death penalty allows the State to identify and
remove individuals who tend to focus on "due process" concerns. Those individuals
would tend to view the evidence from a more neutral position than individuals who
focus on "law and order" concerns and tend to be conviction prone.
On the basis of the currently available studies on death qualification, this court
should find that such a process and the subsequent removal of individuals from the
jury panel based on information received during that process creates a jury that is
conviction prone. Consequently, that process violates the protections of the Utah
Constitution. Furthermore, the history and background of the Utah Constitution are
inconsistent with the economic concerns that underlie the rulings of the federal

"real" issue is the appropriate penalty, and that the defendant really
deserves the death penalty.
Griasbv 569 F. Supp. at 1303.
13

Mitchell, H. and Byrne, D., "The Defendant's Dilemma: The Effects of Juror's
Attitudes and Authoritarianism on Judicial Decision. 25 Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 123 (1975); Thayer, R., "Attitude and Personality Differences
Between Potential Jurors Who Could Return the Death Verdict and Those Who Could
Not." reprinted in Proceedings of 78th Annual convention of the APA (1970);
Crossan, R., "An Investigation Into Certain Personality Variables Among Capital Tried
Jurors." reprinted in Proceedings, 76th Annual Convention APA (1968); Boehm, V.R.,
"Mr. Prejudice. Miss Sympathy, an the Authoritarian Personality: An Application of
Psychological Measuring Techniques to the Problem of Jury Bias." (1968) Wisconsin
Law Review 743; Rokeach, M. MacLellan, D., "Dogmatism and the Death Penalty:
A Re-lnteroretation of the Duouesne Poll Data." 8 Duquesne Law Review 125 (1970).
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constitutional cases. The procedure of "death qualification" was applied in appellant's
case. Appellant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded to the district
court for a new trial.
POINT II
THE STATE'S SYSTEMATIC USE OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES TO EXCLUDE MINORITY JURORS FROM
THE PANEL VIOLATED THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Following the jury selection and prior to the swearing in of the jury, appellant
objected to the prosecution's discriminatory use of peremptory strikes to remove
minority jurors. (Tr. 5 1 3 ) u Subsequent to the objection, the trial court required the
prosecutor state the reasons for exercising the challenges against two of the three
hispanics on the panel. (Tr. 524-25)

Based on those explanations, the trial court

found those peremptory challenges were not race related. In reviewing the factual
determinations of the trial court, this court should employ a clearly erroneous
standard. State v. Cantu II. 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989).
The State may not systematically exclude minorities from a jury through the use
of peremptory challenges. Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79 (1986), State v. Cantu
II. supra; State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991). The Supreme Court summarized
such challenge to a racially based exercise of peremptory challenges as follows:

u

l n State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986), this court held that such
a challenge must be brought prior to the swearing in of the jury. See also: Utah Code
Ann. §78-46-16(1) (1953 as amended).
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In Powers v. Ohio. 499 U.S.
, (1991), we held that a
criminal defendant, regardless of his or her race, may object
to a prosecutor's race-based exclusion of persons from the
petit jury. Our conclusion rested on a two-part analysis.
First, following our opinions in Batson and in Carter v. Jury
Commission of Greene County. 396 U.S. 320 (1970), we
made clear that a prosecutor's race-based peremptory
challenge violated the equal protection rights of those
excluded from jury service. 499 U.S. 113. Second, we
relied on well-established rules of third-party standing to
hold that a defendant may raise third-party standing to hold
that a defendant may raise the excluded juror's equal
protection rights.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. Inc..

U.S.

, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2081 (1991).

This court has recently addressed this issue in State v. Cantu II. supra, and State v.
Span, supra. The issue was also addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v.
Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991).
A.
Appellant Established a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
in the Prosecutor's Use of Peremptory Challenges.
The determination of whether " . . . a prima facie case has been established
requires consideration of all relevant circumstances, including whether there has been
a pattern of strikes against members of a particular group." Edmonson, supra, at
2088. This court has established the following requirements:
The elements necessary to such a prima facie case include
(1) as complete a record as possible, (2) a showing that
persons excluded belong to a cognizable group under the
representative cross-section rule, and (3) a showing that
there exists "a strong likelihood that such persons are being
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challenged because of their group association rather than
because of any specific bias." (citation omitted).
State v. Cantu II. supra, at 518.
In the instant case, seventy-seven jurors were called to appear before the court,
three were excused by the court prior to trial, fourteen were excused for cause, and
twenty-four were stricken by peremptory challenges. (R. 223-26) At least four of the
potential jurors were hispanic.15 (Tr. 489-94, 514-25)
minority. Hernandez v. New York.

U.S.

Hispanics are a cognizable

, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (1991), State v.

Cantu I. 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988), State v. Harrison, supra. Of those potential
jurors, one was excused for cause,16 two were challenged by the prosecution's first
and fifth peremptory strikes, Annie Sanchez and Wendy Mayeda, respectively. One
other, Robert Galvez, sat on the jury. (R. 223-26) The state's exclusion of 67% of
the potential hispanic jurors constitutes a prima facie showing of discrimination.
In Span, the prosecution's use of a peremptory challenge to strike the only
minority juror constituted a prima facie case of discriminatory use of the challenge.
In United States v. David. 803 F.2d 1567 (11thCir. 1986), the court held that "under
Batson. the striking of one black juror for a racial reason violates the Equal Protection
Clause, even where other black jurors are seated, and even when valid reasons for the
striking of some black jurors are shown", 803 F.2d at 1571. In Reynolds v. State.

15

The parties and court determined race based on juror surnames and appearance.
(Tr. 519-20)
16

Madylon Ramos was an acquaintance of appellant's parents. (Tr. 55)
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576 So.2d 1300, 1301 (Fla. 1991), the court noted that excusal of all minority
members was sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the state. See also, Flovd v.
State. 539 So.2d 357, 361 (Ala.Cr. App. 1987). Additionally, the mere fact that one
hispanic juror sat on the jury does not preclude a prima facie showing of a
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. People v. Granillo, 242 Cal.Rptr. 639,
645 (Cal. App. 1987).
The defendant and the stricken jurors need not be of the same racial minority
to advance a Batson challenge, Powers v. Ohio, supra. However, racial identity
between the defendant and jurors heightens the inference of discrimination,
. . . racial identity between the defendant and the excused
person might in some cases be the explanation for the
prosecution's adoption of the forbidden stereotype, and if
the alleged race bias takes this form, it may provide one of
the easier cases to establish both a prima facie case and a
conclusive showing that wrongful discrimination has
occurred. [Batson] 111 S.Ct. at 1373-74.
Span, supra at 23. In this case, the minority jurors who were stricken were of the
same race as appellant. The inference of discrimination is heightened in this case
even though one hispanic sat on the jury.
The majority of the hispanic potential jurors were excluded by the state
exercising its peremptory challenges. Those potential jurors were of the same race
as appellant.

Consequently, appellant established a prima case of discrimination

requiring the State bear the burden of establishing race neutral reasons for the use of
peremptory challenges against potential jurors Wendy Mayeda and Annie Sanchez.
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B.
The State Failed to Provide Sufficient Race Neutral Reasons
to Justify the Peremptory Challenges of Potential Hispanic
Jurors.
In Flovd v. State, supra, the court noted that it is the responsibility of the trial
judge to:
. . . not merely accept the specific reasons given by the
prosecutor at face value, see Hall. 35 Cal.3d at 168, 672
P.2d at 858-59, 197 Cal.Rptr. at 75; Slappv, 503 So.2d at
356; the judge must consider whether the facially neutral
explanations are contrived to avoid admitting acts of group
discrimination . . . The evaluation by the trial judge is
necessary because it is possible that an attorney, although
not intentionally discriminating, may try to find reasons
other than race to challenge a black juror, when race may
be his primary factor in deciding to strike the juror.
539 So.2d at 3 6 1 . This court has articulated the following "list of factors which cast
doubt upon the legitimacy of a purportedly race-neutral explanation:
. . . the presence of one or more of these factors will
tend to show that the state's reasons are not actually
supported by the record or are an impermissible pretext:
(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the juror
in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory
examination, assuming neither the trial court nor opposing
counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror out
for special questioning designed to evoke a certain
response, (4) the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the
facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based on reason
equally applicable to juror[sic] who were not challenged.
State v. Slappv. 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988); See Slappy
v. State. 503 So.2d 350 (Fla.App. 1987)
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State v. Cantu IL suora. Evaluation of the prosecutor's stated reasons in this case
reveals that those reasons are merely a subterfuge for a racially based motivation.17
In response to the trial court's request for a statement of reasons why Wendy
Mayeda was stricken, the deputy county attorney stated:
[Mr. Morgan, Deputy County Attorney]: I would like
to proceed in case the Court's finding that there is no
systematic exclusion to set aside. The prosecutor's neutral
non-race reasons are as follows: Wendy Mayeda, that
State took off, Juror No. 2 1 , for the following reasons:
She's youthful, she indicated she would be suffering a
financial hardship and she also indicated she has personal
problems and would have difficulty in concentrating, and
that she's going through a separation, even though she is
not married at the time. She also indicated that although
she would follow the Court's instruction with regard to the
death penalty, that she had some scruples over the death
penalty, for those reasons, the State elected its peremptory
challenge and removed Wendy Mayeda from the panel.
(Tr. 524)
The age of the selected jurors Stacy Korth, (24 years old) and Christine
Albrycht, age (28 years old) illustrates that the prosecutor's claim that Wendy Mayeda
was removed because of her youth (25 years old) was at best a pretext. With respect
to the issue of juror age, this court has noted,
w

[a]ge (in adults) . . . may not be used to render an
individual incompetent as a prospective juror, but an
exploration of the attitudes and convictions that may exist
in a person who belongs to those groups is certainly

17

The entire voir dire testimony of both Mayeda and Sanchez is set out in the
addendum.
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permissible to aid in discovering actual bias or prejudice
relating to the subject matter of a particular case.
State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055 at 1057 (Utah 1984). The youth of a potential juror and
the youth of the defendant is an insufficient reason to rebut a prima facie showing of
discrimination absent more detailed questioning during voir dire as to potential juror
bias related to the age similarity. Flovd. 539 So.2d at 363. This is particularly true
in the instant case where one of the victims is also young. Wendy Mayeda was asked
no questions concerning her age or potential bias that her age as related to the
defendant's age may raise.
Wendy Mayeda's personal problems were also articulated as a reason for
striking her from the jury. Ms. Mayeda never indicated that she could not serve on
the jury. She merely appraised counsel and the court that she was having some
personal problems.18 The trial judge acknowledged her concern but noted, "It's a

18

The interchange between the court and Ms. Mayeda went as follows:
The Court: I believe the bailiff indicated to me yesterday that you had
some concerns that you wanted to voice privately.
Ms. Mayeda: Yeah. I'm going through a separation right now. We're
not married, we just lived together. And I'm just having a really hard
time with trying to deal with all that; and then trying to deal with this
and concentrate on this, too. And I just wanted to bring that to your
attention and let you know.
The Court: . . . I don't mean to belittle your problems, but we do need
your services and that you would need to be able to apply your attention
and your best efforts to help us solve this case.
Ms. Mayeda: Yes. I would try.
28

problem that somebody, either you or somebody like you, is going to have to spend
some time on this jury . . . All of us in life, unfortunately, have to go through personal
crisis as well as do other things that are required of them during the course of their
life. . . " (Tr. 237) The trial judge observed Ms. Mayeda's demeanor and ability to
concentrate.

He was satisfied that she was qualified to serve as a juror.

Her

response to questioning was appropriate and forthright. There was no indication that
Ms. Mayeda would have been impaired in her duties as a juror.
The prosecutor also asserted that Ms. Mayeda was removed because of her
scruples concerning the death penalty. This reason to raises other legal concerns.19
However, when considered in the context of the other reasons given and the manner
of exclusion, it is questionable whether this was actually the prosecutor's concern
rather than Ms. Mayeda's race. Jurors, Carr, Galvez and Chedester also expressed
some degree of concern over the death penalty or appropriate circumstances in which
the death penalty should be applied but were not removed by the State. Illustrative
of the inconsistency in the prosecutor's asserted concern is the situation with juror
Chedester. She was not removed from the venire even after stating that she did not
believe in the death penalty, but would be able to apply the law.20

(Tr. 237-238)
19

See: Point I, B, supra.

20

Juror Chedester at one point made the following statement: "As I did say, you
know, I am not sure if I believe in capital punishment, but probably one of the few
that don't." (Tr. 301)
29

The prosecutor did not challenge Ms. Mayeda for cause based on either her
personal problems or her concerns about the death penalty.

However, other

veniremen were removed for these same reasons. "If the such concerns were valid
and substantiated by the record, they would have supported a challenge for cause.
"The fact that the prosecutor did not make any such challenge . . . should disqualify
him from advancing the concern as a justification of a peremptory challenge."
Hernandez v. New York, supra, (1991) (Stevens dissenting).
Finally, the prosecutor stated that serving on the jury would be a financial
hardship to Ms. Mayeda. There is no support in the record for such a statement. (Tr.
89-96; 236-246) This unsubstantiated reason merely casts doubt on all of the other
reasons articulated by the prosecutor. The prosecutor merely rattled off a list of
facially appropriate reasons for exercising peremptory challenges, none of which can
withstand scrutiny or are supported by the record. The only conclusion to be drawn
was that Ms. Mayeda was stricken based on her race.
The prosecutor articulated the following reasons for the use of his initial
peremptory challenge against Annie Sanchez:
With respect to Annie Sanchez, Juror No. 46, the
State pre-empted her for the following neutral, non-racial
reasons. She is youthful, she's 21 years old. She seemed
to identify with the defendant during the course of the jury
voir dire. She was constantly looking at him. She also
indicated that she has scruples against the death penalty,
even though she would follow, she had to be talked to
quite a bit in comparison to the rest of the jurors, about her
ability to pass on the death penalty; therefore, for those
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reasons, the State preempted Annie Sanchez, Juror No. 46,
using its first preemptory challenge.
Mr. VanSciver [defense counsel]: All right. Seemed
to identify with the defendant is the very basis why his preemptory and it's his first one.
Mr. Morgan [the prosecutor]: Good point.
Mr. VanSciver: It's race oriented.
Mr. Morgan: Good point. Like to clarify that.
Seemed to identify based upon her youth, based on her eye
contact with him and based on her friendliness toward the
defendant. Not that she identified in the sense they were
from the same culture.
(Tr. 524-25)
The same argument as articulated with respect to Wendy Mayeda's youth
applies to Ms. Sanchez. However, Ms. Sanchez was questioned about her potential
bias in light of the closeness of her age to the defendant. She was unequivocal in her
answer that her youth and the defendant's youth would not effect her ability to render
a fair verdict.21 No other juror was questioned concerning age bias including either

21

During the individual voir dire with Ms. Sanchez, the following exchange took
place:
Mr. Morgan [the prosecutor]: One question. Mrs. Sanchez, you're 21?
Ms. Sanchez: Yeah.
Mr. Morgan: You think you can take a look at this case, and evidence,
and put aside any feelings of sympathy you may have?
Ms. Sanchez: Yeah.
Mr. Morgan: The fact the defendant is very young, is that going to
bother you?
Ms. Sanchez: No.
(Tr. 413)
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Mr. Cabot Nelson, age 18 (Tr. 154) or Wendy Mayeda. The prosecutor's questioning
of Ms. Sanchez on the age issue appears to be a selective attempt to illicit a response
that could provide an excuse to remove her from the jury panel. Floyd, supra.
The prosector next noted that Ms. Sanchez appeared to identify with appellant.
As noted by trial counsel, this reasoning goes to the heart of a Batson challenge.
Absent all of the surrounding facts, this would be a legitimate reason to exclude any
juror. However, identification with the defendant is a particularly suspect reason for
exclusion, when the potential juror and defendant are of the same race, State v. Span,
supra.

This is because this perceived identification was no more than a subtle

stereotypical race categorizing of the defendant and Ms. Sanchez. Royd, supra at
361.
Finally, the prosecutor reasoned that "she had to be talked to quite a bit in
comparison to the rest of the jurors, about her ability to pass on the death penalty."
The record belies this contention. When questioned concerning the death penalty,
Ms. Sanchez stated:
The Court: All right. Do you have any feelings about the death penalty?
Ms. Sanchez: No.
The Court: If, in this case, after the evidence were heard by the jury
regarding mitigating circumstances and aggravating circumstances, and
you personally don't worry about the other jurors. But you personally
were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and to your own satisfaction
that the aggravating circumstances out weighed the mitigation
circumstances; and secondly, that death was the only appropriate
penalty; would you be able to vote for the death penalty?
Ms. Sanchez: Yes. (Tr. 409)
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Other potential jurors were subjected to much more extensive questioning about the
death penalty.22
The prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike Ms. Mayeda and Ms.
Sanchez in a discriminatory manner meets the requirements of Cantu II. Both of those
potential jurors belong to a cognizable racial group. The record indicates that there
is a strong likelihood that those two jurors were challenged because of their race
rather than any specific bias.

The acceptance of the prosecutor's reasons for

exercising the peremptory challenges as not based on race was clearly erroneous.
The use of the State's peremptory challenges in this manner denied the potential
jurors of their constitutional right to equal protection.

As previously discussed,

appellant has third party standing to challenge the denial of that right. Appellant's
judgment and conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT
THE TWO HOMICIDES WERE COMMITTED INCIDENT TO
A SINGLE ACT, SCHEME, COURSE OF CONDUCT OR
CRIMINAL EPISODE.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the court must consider
the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Stewart. 729
P.2d 610 (Utah 1986).

This court must further determine if the evidence is

sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have

"Illustrative of such questioning of potential jurors expressing concern about the
death penalty is that of potential juror Johnson. (Tr. 323-335)
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entertained a reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d
232 (Utah 1992).
The appellant was convicted of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the
First Degree, as described in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(b) (1953 as amended).
That statute provides:
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the
death of another under any of the following circumstances
The homicide was committed incident to one act,
scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during
which two or more persons are killed.
That statute has not previously been interpreted by the courts of this state. The
questionable part as applied to this case requires that the "death was caused under
circumstances where the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme,
course of conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons where
killed." That is the element that distinguishes first degree from second degree murder.
Second degree murder is established if the State proves that the defendant knowingly
or intentionally caused the death of another. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1953 as
amended).
The word "act" and the phrase "criminal episode" are defined in the criminal
code. "Act" is defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(1) (1953 as amended). That
statute provides: "'Act' means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech."
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The phrase "single criminal episode" is defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-1-401 (1953
as amended). That statue provides:
In this part unless the context requires a different
definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct
which is closely related in time and is incident to an
attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective.
The cases addressing this statute generally deal with a single defendant committing
a series of criminal offenses. In State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977), this
court held that there was not a single criminal episode where the defendant
committed a robbery in one county and kidnapped hitchhikers in another county.
Likewise, in State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977), the evidence did not
establish a single criminal episode where the defendant unlawfully took a vehicle then
failed to stop at the command of a police officer. In State v. Parker, 705 P.2d 1174
(Utah 1985), this court held that separate burglaries in separate buildings in an
apartment complex do not constitute a single criminal episode.
"Scheme" and "course of conduct" are not defined by statute. However, there
are several cases interpreting a similar provision in the Washington homicide statute.
In State v. Kincaid. 103 Wash.2d 304, 692 P.2d 823 (1985), the court noted that the
phase "common scheme or plan" as used in that double homicide statute required that
there be a connection or nexus between the murders and the victims. The court went
on to note that a "scheme or plan" is a design, method of action or system formed
to accomplish a purpose. In Kincaid the defendant entered a house and killed two
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people. Earlier, in State v. Griosbv. 97 Wash.2d 493, 647 P.2d 6 (1982), that same
court had held that the statute requires that there be a nexus between the killings to
constitute a common scheme or plan as described in the homicide statute.
In this case appellant was acquitted of Count II for the murder of Shayne
Newingham. Consequently, the two homicides were not caused by the same act. All
of the other provisions of the statute require some type of agreement or plan. There
was no evidence of such a scheme, plan or common objective in this case. The
Newinghams were not expected at the party. The evidence supporting the conviction
indicated that Don Newingham and Kenny Salas came to the door of the residence.
(Tr. 920-921)

When they were told to leave, Newingham objected and appellant

showed a knife and requested them to leave. (Tr. 615) Salas got Newingham to the
car where Gabaldon struck Newingham in the face.

(Tr. 6 8 1 , 927)

Newingham

knocked Gabaldon to the ground and appellant stabbed Newingham in the back,
resulting in his death. (Tr. 682, 927)
The jury was instructed on this issue of accomplice liability. (Tr. 301 ). 23 and
appellant was acquitted of the death of Shayne Newingham as alleged in Count II of
23

That instruction provided:
Every person acting with the mental state required
for the commission of the offense, who solicits, requests,
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person
to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense is
criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

(R. 301)
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the Information. Consequently, the State is not entitled to the same inferences with
respect to that count as it is with respect to the offense of conviction. The evidence
indicated that Shayne Newingham got out of the car as the fight broke out with his
father. (Tr. 884)

He knocked out Manuel Martinez then hit Manuel Alvarez and

Fernando Negrete. (Tr. 1031, 1054, 1092, 1124, 1234) Shayne Newingham was
stabbed with a large knife and died as a result of those wounds. (Tr. 983) The entire
fight lasted only a matter of minutes.
There was no evidence of any plan, scheme or criminal objective to cause the
deaths of Shayne and Don Newingham.

Consequently, there was insufficient

evidence to establish the element that distinguished first from second degree murder.
The judgment and conviction for murder in the first degree must be reversed. The
case should be remanded to the district court with an order to impose judgment for
the lesser offense of murder in the second degree.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY TO DISREGARD AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER.
The trial court initially correctly instructed the jury on the elements of first
degree murder as described in Count I of the Information. (R. 303)

However, in

response to questions from the jury raised during their deliberations, the court
improperly instructed the jury to disregard an essential element of that offense. (R.
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200)

Questions relating to jury instructions are matters of law which this court

reviews for correctness. State v. Hamilton, supra.
Paragraph 3 of the jury instruction number 11 described the element that
distinguished first from second degree murder.24 (R. 303) That paragraph stated,
"That Fred A. Alvarez caused said death under
circumstances where the homicide was committed incident
to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode
during which two or more persons were killed. (R. 303)
Defense counsel had argued during the course of the proceedings that appellant would
have to be criminally liable for both murders to be convicted of first degree murder.
(Tr. 1405) During their deliberations, the jurors made written requests for clarification
of this paragraph of instruction number 11.
The critical question asked by the jury during their deliberations was as follows,
"In Instruction no. 11 element no. 3. [sic] Do you need to satisfy all elements listed
or just one?" (R. 200) The court responded, over objection of appellant (Tr. 1407),
as follows: "Any single element set forth in paragraph no. 3 of Instruction no. 11 is
sufficient." (R. 200)

In another inquiry, the jury asked if they needed to find the

defendant guilty of both murders to convict him of Murder in the First Degree? (R.
196) The trial court responded by directing the jurors to instructions 6, 11, 12, 13
and 18. (R. 196)

24

See: Point III, infra.
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The third element described in Instruction no. 11 contains two parts. First, the
death was caused under circumstances where the homicide was committed incident
to one act, scheme, course of conduct or criminal episode. Second, two or more
persons were killed. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(b) (1953 as amended). By telling
the jury that only one of the parts or elements of that third paragraph need be
established, the trial court essentially told the jury that the State need to prove only
that two or more persons were killed.25 It is error for the trial court to fail to instruct
the jury on an essential element of the offense. In State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah
1980) the court held that it is prejudicial error to instruct the jury that the offense of
theft by deception requires an intent to deprive. Likewise, in State v. Harmon. 712
P.2d 291 (Utah 1986), the court found prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury
on the elements of attempt, when the defendant is charged with attempted robbery.
In the instant case, it was error to instruct the jury to disregard one of the two parts
of the element that distinguished first from second degree murder.
The answer to the jury's inquiry was clearly a misstatement of the law. There
is a reasonable likelihood, based on this instruction and the response to the
subsequent question, that the jurors believed that they need only find that two
persons were killed to convict appellant of first degree murder.

25

Furthermore, as

The appropriate response to the question would be to instruct the jury that they
had to find any one of the alternatives of one act, scheme, course of conduct or
criminal episode. Further, the jury would also have to find that alternative occurred
when two or more persons were killed.
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previously discussed, 26 the evidence was not sufficient to prove the first requirement
of this particular element. That increases the likelihood that the jurors found only that
two deaths occurred. Consequently, the error was prejudicial. The judgment and
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
ENHANCING APPELLANT'S SENTENCE PURSUANT TO
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §76-3-203.1 (1953 AS
AMENDED).
The amended information filed in this case alleged a sentencing enhancement
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended).27 (R. 10-11)

A

general objection based on constitutional grounds was made to this enhancement. (Tr.
1422) The review of the constitutionality of this provision involves a legal question
and the court should apply a correction of error standard, State v. Hamilton, supra.
The issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the elements of the
enhancement provision should be reviewed under the same standard as described in
Point III, supra.28
The applicable portion of that statute provides:
(1)

(a)
A person who commits any offense listed in
subsection (3) in concert with two or more persons is

26

See: Point II, supra.

27

Commonly referred to as the "gang enhancement".

28

See page 28, supra.
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subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided
below.
(b)
"In concert with two or more persons" as used in
this section means the defendant and two or more other
persons would be criminally liable for the offense as parties
under Section 76-2-202.
The statute involves two due process violations.

First, it is void for vagueness.

Second, the statute allows for enhanced penalties based on uncharged or unproved
conduct of unnamed persons. The third legal question relates to the right to a jury
trial in the application of the enhancement. In this case, the trial court committed
further error because there was insufficient evidence to apply the statute.
A.
Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended) is
Void for Vagueness.
The due process clauses of both the federal and state constitutions prohibit the
application of criminal statutes that are vague. In Gravned v. Citv of Rockford. 408
U.S. 104 (1972), the Court described this doctrine:
it is a basic principle of due process that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not
clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important
values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning.
Second, if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must
provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A
vague law impermissibility delegates basic policy matters to
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policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc
and subjective bias, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary
and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a
vague statue "abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First
Amendment freedoms," it operates to inhibit the exercise
of those freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead
citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than
if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked." [citations omitted]
408 U.S. at 108-109.
In Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), the Court explained that the
vagueness doctrine is critical with respect to a legislative failure to define criminal
standards:
Our Constitution is designed to maximize individual
freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty. Statutory
limitations on those freedoms are examined for substantive
authority and content as well as for definiteness or
certainty of expression.
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine
requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. Although the doctrine focuses on actual
notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have
recognized recently that the more important aspect of the
vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other
principal element of the doctrine-the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement." Where the legislature fails to provide such
minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a
standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors,
and juries to pursue their personal predilections, [citations
omitted]
461 U.S. at 357-358.
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The first issue to be addressed under this test is whether Utah Code Ann. §763-203.1 (1953 as amended) gives a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly, Gravned,
suora. It would be unlikely that a person of ordinary intelligence could understand
what it is to act in concert, or with joint intent, with two or more unidentified people.
That person would be unable to conform his conduct to such a law. See Utah Code
Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1)(a) and (b); Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202; Utah Code Ann. §76-3203.1 §(5)(b).
The next issue to be addressed is whether Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1953
as amended) provides explicit standards for those who apply the statute or does it
impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary
and discriminatory application, Gravned. supra. The statute covers any situation
where more than two people may be charged with a crime. There are no limits on the
discretion of prosecutors who may request that the statue be applied in a particular
case.

Likewise, there is no requirement that a prosecutor has to request the

enhancement.

Furthermore, the statute may be applied based on the actions of

uncharged and unnamed individuals, thus denying defendants notice of the allegations
against them and precluding a defendant from meeting those allegations. In State v.
Roberts, 612 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980) and State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah
1982). The court found that fundamental fairness required that a criminal defendant
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be allowed to inspect a presentence report. Relying on the actions of uncharged and
unnamed parties is analogous to preventing a defendant from meeting the unfounded
accusations in a presentence report. The final problem with respect to the lack of
standards is that the statute does not provide any particular burden of proof to be
applied by the judge in making his findings.29 That allows the statute to be applied
in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. The trial judge in this case did not make
any conclusions that any particular burden of proof was applied by him. (R. 346-7)
The last issue to be addressed under the federal standard is whether the statute
infringes upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms and might chill the
exercise of those protected freedoms. Gravned. supra. This statute does potentially
impinge on the right to association, freedom of speech, to peaceably assemble and
receive the benefits of uniform operation of the law.
In addition to these three tests the due process clause of the Utah Constitution
requires that legislation must meet its purpose in a rational manner.

In State v.

Cooeland. 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah, 1988), this court held that Article I, Section 7 of the
Utah Constitution required that portions of a statute governing the sentencing of
mentally ill offenders be stricken because the statutory provisions bore no rational
relationship to the purposes of the statute.

29

The legislative history of the gang

When a death sentence is at issue the State must meet a burden or "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982). That same
burden of proof ought to be applied to the enhancement statute.
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enhancement statute indicates that it was intended to be used in relatively limited
circumstances.30
While the purpose of the statute is not clear on its face. The record of the
senate and house debates indicates that the statute was intended by the legislature
to be enforced in select cases involving gangs. Senator Fordham, the sponsor of the
bill in the Senate, stated,
Originally, we had a bill called the "Organization Gang Bill.w
In an working with California, who this bill was patterned
after, their bill, and after they passed their law, we had an
influx of gang members coming from California and
infiltrating into Utah and establishing residence here and
working as ah in their organization as members of, who had
broken off from the California gangs. I think we need to
send a message to these organized people that there isn't
a place for them in Utah.
(T. 8)
The house sponsor of the bill, Representative Rushton, described Utah Code Ann.
§76-3-203.1 as necessary to combat the gang-organized crime stemming from
California-based crack cocaine franchises (T. 1-3)
Both Senator Fordham and Representative Rushton explained that the model for
the Utah statute was the California Street Terrorism Prevention Act.31 The apparent
reason that the Utah statute was drafted without direct reference to its true purpose
was that the California prosecutors were having difficulties enforcing the explicit

30

The debate on this statute in the legislature is attached in the addendum.

31

Attached in the addendum.
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California Act.

That is because the California Act had a very limited purpose

expressed in the body of the statute. The Utah Statewide Association of Prosecutors
and other law enforcement groups hoped to avoid those difficulties by drafting Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended) in a "benign" manner. (T. 8; 2-3) While
the language of the statue does not expressly indicate, Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1
(1953 as amended) was designed to be applied in very narrow circumstances. In
introducing the bill to the house, Representative Rushton explained its intended
narrow applicability:
[T]he idea behind the enhanced penalties in California and
the idea here was to get that center core, that's the core
group of hardened criminals that supplies the money,
supplies the impetus for a true criminal street gang. We've
got to differentiate that between a street gang and a
criminal street gang-it's a different would altogether. Ah,
it gets to the hardened core, and the social workers tell us
that the only thing to do with them to allow social workers
to work with the remainder of the young people at risk in
these gangs is to get that hardened core off the streets.
The enhanced penalty is designed for that purpose.
(T. 3)
During the house floor debates, Representative Joann Millner voiced concern
that the representatives should take personal responsibility to befriend and rehabilitate
local street gang members. (T. 4)

In response to her comments, Representative

Rushton reassured,
And ah, this law is directed at the core, it's not directed, as
Joann has expressed, kids that are at risk, you see them
wearing the gang signs, their ball cap turned around
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backwards on the West, or they sign X other with finger
signs like this as they go by. Each gang has its own finger
sign. Ah, these people that are at risk, and these are kids
at risk. This bill is directed at that core criminal element,
that three percent of those six hundred gang members that
have been identified that provide the father figure in these
gangs. And they provide also the connection the California
gangs, the connection to the crack cocaine, the money that
is fueling this explosion of gang activity in our cities and I'd
like to ask you for your support for this bill . . .
(T. 7) When Representative Prante asked how the broadly worded statute could be
limited in its application, as intended, Representative Rushton indicated that the
proper, limited enforcement of the act was insured by judicial discretion in imposing
the sentence enhancement. (T. 6-7)
This enhancement statute was not intended to be applied to a street fight
during a party where more than three people are involved on any one side as was the
situation in this case. The statute covers any situation where three or more people
may be involved in the commission of a crime. The breadth of the statute is not
logically related to the concerns and intent of the legislature in enacting the
enhancement statute.
If the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended) fails only
one of the federal tests it is impermissibly vague and violates the due process clause
of the federal constitution. The statute also fails the state constitutional test as its
provisions are not rationally related to its purpose. The application of this provision
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to enhance appellant's sentence violated his right to due process of law.

The

mandatory minimum sentence enhancement must be ordered vacated.
B.
Due Process is Violated by Allowing a Criminal Sentence to
be Enhanced by Uncharged Conduct of Unnamed Parties.
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-206.1 (5)(b) (1953 as amended) provides for sentencing
enhancements based on uncharged, unproved conduct of others. That part of the
statute provides:
It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties
under this section that the persons with whom the actor is
alleged to have acted in concert are identified,
apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or
lesser offense.
Ordinarily, an individual must first be "adjudged guilty of an offense" before he is
sentenced.

Utah Code. Ann. §76-3-101 (1953 as amended).

Pursuant to

subparagraph (5) (b), not only does the individual remain responsible for his own
actions, 32 he is also held accountable for the actions of two other persons. Utah
Code Ann. §76-3-203.1(5) (b) (1953 as amended).
These "persons" need not be "identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted".
i£. Nothing contained within subparagraph (5)(b) guides or limits the discretion of the
sentencing judge in his "contingent finding" that the enhancement be imposed. Utah

32

A defendant still remains accountable for the underlying crime pursuant to the
general sentencing provisions. Only the term would be affected by the State's failure
to prove accomplice liability.
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Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (5)(c) (1953 as amended) provides "The imposition of the
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this section is
applicable". The accomplices could be exonerated completely. Indeed, the sentence
of the targeted individual could even be enhanced without establishing any connection
whatsoever between the individual and the other persons. "Gang" activity would not
have to actually exist. Mere allegations or the perceived unlawfulness of "in concert"
behaviors could still improperly support a mandatory minimum enhanced prison term.
See Utah Code Ann. §76-302-3.1 (5)(b) (1953 as amended).
In short, since the legislature intended to enhance penalties for "[ojffenses
committed by three of more persons, proof of accomplice liability must precede the
enhancement. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1(1). Individuals acting in concert with
less than two persons are penalized elsewhere in the Code and are not necessarily
subjected to enhanced sentences.

Absent proof of the accomplices' convictions, or

at minimum criminal liability, a defendant can be punished for the acts of another for
which there is no criminal liability. This is what occurred in the instant case. No
other persons were convicted of the homicide. Furthermore, the trial judge found that
the penalty could be enhanced based on the actions of unnamed persons. (R. 346-7)
Such a procedure is obviously fundamentally unfair and violates a criminal defendant's
right to due process of law. Appellant's enhanced sentence must be ordered to be
vacated.
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c.
A Defendant is Entitled to a Jury Finding of Criminal
Liability Under the Statute Before the Sentencing
Enhancement is Appropriate.
Article II, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees a defendant the right
to a jury trial.

A jury, rather than the judge, should first find that the targeted

individual acted "in concert with two or more persons." Utah Code Ann. §76-3203.1 (5)(c) (1953 as amended). This is because Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1953
as amended) essentially creates a new crime.
In State v. Wedae, 652 P.2d 773 (Ore 1982), a jury convicted the defendant
of first degree robbery for his involvement in the charged offense with two other
accomplices, lid. at 774. The jury did not necessarily base its verdict on a finding that
Wedge used a firearm, although that inference may have been raised in the evidence
presented at trial. At the sentencing proceeding, the court found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Wedge used or threatened to use a firearm in the commission of the
offense. Wedae, supra at 733 fn. 1 (citing Or. Rev. Stat. 161.610[4]). That statute
purported to give the sentencing court enhancement power in a manner similar to
Utah's statute.
The court agreed with the defendant, explaining that the "use of firearm" was
not contained specifically in the charged offense:
Although the challenged statue is denominated an
enhanced penalty statute, in effect it creates a new crime.
The jury only considered evidence offered on the question
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of first degree robbery, and convicted him of that offense,
but the defendant was sentenced on the basis of having
been found guilty of the crime of "first degree robbery
using a firearm.- If the legislature had actually described
the crime as "first degree robbery using a firearm" the use
of a firearm would certainly be an element and there would
be no doubt defendant would have a right to a jury
determination of guilt. The legislature cannot eliminate
constitutional protections by separating and relabeling
elements of a crime.
652 P.2d at 778.
Notwithstanding the trial court's "finding beyond a reasonable doubt" that
Wedge had used a firearm, the appellate court was unwilling to circumvent the
defendant's right to a jury trial absent proof, to a jury's satisfaction, that Wedge had
actual physical possession of a gun during the robbery. See id- at 776, 778. The
enhancement could not stem from the inference that because two of the three
masked robbers were armed, Wedge was one of the men with a gun. The court
specifically stated that "there is no statutory basis for enhanced penalty based on
vicarious liability. . .". id- at 776.
By analogy, the principles of Wedae apply to Utah's gang enhancement statute.
Despite a disclaimer to the contrary,33 the enhancement statute creates a new crime
and punishes an individual without a jury determination on accomplice liability. Like
the omitted "use of a firearm" element of the first degree robbery offense in Wedae,

33

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (5)(a) (1953 as amended) provides: "This section
does not create any separate offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the
primary offense."
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the "primary offenses" cited by the gang enhancement statute improperly excludes
proof of an element-accomplice liability. A defendant's right to a jury finding on
accomplice liability cannot be eviscerated by the trial court's finding made at the time
of sentencing. Since the gang enhancement statute allows the trial court to add such
an element into the primary offense for purposes of punishment, the statute violates
the appellant's right to a jury trial. In Wedae. the court stated, "Because the extent
of punishment is to be determined according to the existence of the proscribed fact,
it must be proved at trial". Likewise, in State v. Moeller. 860 P.2d 130 (Or. App.
1991), the court stated, "facts which go to the criminal acts for which a defendant
is to be punished must be proved to a jury's satisfaction unless admitted or waived".
860 P.2dat 132.
Appellant was not given the opportunity for a jury trial on the issue of the
sentencing enhancement. The judgment should be vacated and the case remanded
to the district court for a jury determination on the issue of the sentencing
enhancement.
D.
The Trial Court's Finding that Appellant Acted in Concert
with Two or More People was Clearly Erroneous.
In imposing the twenty year minimum mandatory enhancement to appellant's
life sentence, the trial court entered written findings. Those findings provided:
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1.
The defendant having been found guilty of Criminal
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree has been adjudged
guilty of a capital offense for which a life sentence has
been imposed;
2.
This offense was committed in concert with two or
more persons, including but not limited to the criminal
participation in the assaults causing the deaths of Donald
and Shayne Newingham by Richard Gabaldon, Manuel
Martinez, Manuel Alvarez, Tony DeHerrera and others
unknown, each of which would be criminally liable as
parties to the offense.
3.
The Court finds no circumstances, in the interests of
justice, or otherwise, which would justify suspension of
imposition or the execution of the enhanced sentence.
Therefore, the Court finds that the enhanced penalty
provided by Section 76-3-203.1, . . . applies and defendant
is ordered to serve a minimum term of twenty [20] years in
prison.
(R. 346-7)
In defining the phrase "in concert", Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1 (1)(b) (1953
as amended) provides:
H

ln concert with two or more persons" as used in
this section means the defendant and two or more other
persons would be criminally liable for the offense as parties
under Section 76-2-202.
The parties statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1953 as amended) provides:
Every person, acting with the mental state required
for the commission of an offense who directly commits the
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a
party for such conduct.
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The mental state required for a violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1 )(b) (1953
as amended) is that of intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another.
In its findings, the trial court named four specific individuals who acted "in
concert" with the appellant. Of those individuals, Anthony DeHerrera was the only
one against whom evidence was admitted indicating involvement in a homicide. (Tr.
1014, 1143, 1236) However, if the jury had believed this evidence in its entirety,
appellant would not have been convicted of the homicide charge. Richard Gabaldon,
admitted engaging in a fight. (Tr. 636) He admitted to kicking the victims after they
were down. (Tr. 654, 656) At no time did Gabaldon admit to causing the death of
anyone or intending to cause the death of another. The State's witnesses testified
that Gabaldon may have started the fight, but did not have any involvement with any
knifings. (Tr. 682, 880, 927) Gabaldon was convicted of the lesser included offense
of aggravated assault. (Tr. 14) Clearly, his involvement did not rise to the level of
criminal culpability and intent to meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202
and 76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended).
Manuel Martinez and Manuel Alvarez fall into about the same level of
culpability. Both admitted being outside during the fight. (Tr. 1052, 1092) The only
evidence of participation in the fight was that Shayne Newingham struck Martinez
then threw him into a truck rendering Martinez unconscious. (Tr. 1054)

Manuel

Alvarez was also beaten by Shayne Newingham and had his jacket and shirt pulled off
by Newingham. (Tr. 1092)

Alvarez admitted kicking Shayne Newingham after
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Newingham was the ground. (Tr. 1093) These two individuals also fail to meet the
statutory requirements of culpability to enhance appellant's sentence.
The trial court's finding that appellant acted in concert with two or more other
persons is clearly erroneous. The evidence indicates that only one other person,
DeHerrera, may have had the requisite intent and performed an act sufficient to
qualify under the statute. The judgment should be ordered reversed and the minimum
mandatory twenty year sentence vacated.
CONCLUSION
Appellant is requesting three alternative forms of relief. First, the judgment and
conviction be reversed and a new trial ordered.

The basis for that relief is the

improprieties in the jury selection process and the improper instruction given to the
jury on the elements of the offense of first degree murder.

In the alternative,

appellant requests that the judgment and conviction be reversed and the charge
reduced to second degree murder. That is based on the insufficiency of the evidence
to prove first degree murder. The final alternative requested by appellant is for the
judgment to be reversed and the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence vacated.
That is based on the unconstitutionality of the enhancement statute and the lack of
sufficient evidence to prove the elements of that statute.
DATED this

day of June, 1992.
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